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Abstract
 The large and vibrant informal trade between India and Nepal continues to thrive despite
unilateral/bilateral/regional/multilateral trade liberalisation in the two countries.   This calls for an in-
depth analysis of India's informal trade with Nepal. Using insights from the New Institutional Economics
informal and formal institutions engaged in cross-border trade are contrasted. The objective in
juxtaposing formal and informal institutions in performing similar transactions viz., engaging in cross-
border international trade is threefold: first, to understand how informal trading markets function vis-à-vis
formal trading arrangements second, to analyse formal and informal trading arrangements particularly in
the context of the relative importance of institutional factors vis-à-vis trade and domestic policy
distortions, and third, to see whether informal trading arrangements provide better institutional solutions
than formal trading arrangements.
 The analysis, carried out on the basis of an extensive survey conducted in India and Nepal reveals
that informal traders in India and Nepal have developed efficient mechanisms for contract enforcement,
information flows, risk sharing and risk mitigation. Further, informal traders prefer to trade through the
informal channel because the transaction costs of trading in the informal channel are significantly lower
than the formal channel implying that informal trade takes place due to the inefficient institutional set up
in the formal channel. Moreover, lower education levels of informal traders could  be an important
deterrent for using the formal channel. Finally, the analysis of discriminating characteristics of formal
and informal traders in India and Nepal   indicates that transaction cost and education level are the two
common discriminating factors. An important policy implication from the study is that unless the
transacting environment of formal traders improves, informal trade will continue to coexist with formal
trade, even if free trade is established in the SAARC region.
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India’s Informal Trade with Nepal:
A Qualitative Assessment
1.  Introduction
The focus of this study is on India's informal trade with Nepal. At the outset, it is
important to clarify what informal means. The term informal has been used to denote (a)
illegal economic activities, by others to denote (b) parallel markets (i.e. those unregulated
by the government) and by still others to mean (c) extra-legal activities. Clearly, there is
an illegal component to informal trade if we consider trafficking in drugs, narcotics, or
arms. In addition, if informal trade refers to pure smuggling of goods across borders, i.e. it
is taking place primarily to circumvent tariff and non-tariff barriers; it could be termed as
illegal trade. However it is entirely possible that a significant part of informal trade is in
the nature of extra-legal trading, tolerated in practice even if illegal in the letter of the law.
This occurs due to the fact that the governance of state machinery does not extend to all
corners of society in poor countries.1 For instance, informal trading enterprises would be
those that are unregistered and unlicensed. In the context of the present study, while all
three definitions are relevant, trafficking in drugs, narcotics and arms has not been
considered.
In recent years, the countries of South Asia have adopted not only unilateral trade
policy reforms but have also undertaken liberalisation under Uruguay Round and
successive rounds of South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangements (SAPTA).2 In spite of
these developments, the intra-regional trade in South Asia was less than 5% of their global
trade in 1998.3  In addition India and Nepal have gone ahead with a bilateral trading
                                                            
1 See Deardorff and Stopler (1990) for the African experience.
2 In 1991, South Asian countries of Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Nepal
decided to establish a preferential trading block in the region. Since then three rounds of SAPTA have
been concluded. The member countries have also envisaged the formation of a free trading block by 2001.
3 See IMF (1999).
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arrangement 4. However, it is too early to say whether this would inject vitality   into trade
flows in the region. On the other hand informal trade between the two countries continues
to thrive. One way would be to focus on the large and vibrant informal trade that India has
with Nepal5. If such trade is brought within the ambit of official trade, a significant
increase in total trade could be witnessed.  In this context, the present study attempts to
understand the elements underlying the vitality of informal trading arrangements as well as
to identify the bottlenecks of formal trading arrangement between India and Nepal.
Specifically, the study focuses on the following three issues of interest in the context of
India's informal trade: (a) what are the characteristics of informal trade, (b) why it takes
place, and (c) how it differs from formal trade.
To the extent that informal trade is taking place, due to high tariffs and non-tariff
barriers in the region, it is reasonable to expect such trade to shift to legal channels with
removal of trade barriers.  However, free/preferential trade agreements (FTA/PTA)
require rules of origin to ensure that goods from third countries passing through another
member country of the FTA/PTA meet domestic content requirement before arriving at the
final market for consumption to benefit from duty free entry.  Such rules of origin can be
complex and sometimes provide the excuse to block official trade making informal trade an
attractive option.
     Illegal trade could also take place due to domestic policy distortions.  For instance, a
trader has the incentive to siphon off subsidised items from the public distribution system
to the neighbouring countries if such commodities fetch higher prices across the border.
Illegal trade of this kind can be checked only if domestic reforms address such policy
distortions.
If there are factors other than trade and domestic policy barriers that determine
informal trade, then a deeper understanding is essential. There could be several
institutional and non-economic factors that influence informal trade.  It may be possible that
an efficient institutional arrangement exists, which supports informal trade.  If this is so,
                                                            
4 Under the bilateral Free Trade Agreement between India and Nepal the Government of India provides
access to the Indian market free of customs duties and  quantitative restrictions for all articles
manufactured in Nepal. Nepal on the other hand has imposed a tariff rate 20% lower than its unilateral
tariff on all imports from India.
5 According to Muni (1992) India's informal trade with Nepal was 8 to 10 times of official trade in 1989.
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trade through informal channel may actually be preferred. It is also possible that the
informal channel has a better payments mechanism or has a good marketing distribution
network.  These factors would attract traders to the informal channel.
On the other hand, if the infrastructure supporting formal trade is weak and costs of
trading increase substantially with higher volumes, some of it may spill over into informal
trading.6  A distinctive feature of the South Asian countries is the inadequate transit and
transport systems. This often results in high transport costs in the region and creates a
strong incentive for trade to take place through informal channels.7
There are other barriers to official trade, which make informal trade a preferred
option.  In particular, the official machinery through which formal traders have to operate
may be very cumbersome causing delays and thereby escalation in costs.  Moreover, the
rent-seeking activities of the public servants at each step of transactions may dissuade
traders from using the official channel. It is also possible that banking facilities are
inadequate and traders therefore have to use the informal channel for trading.
There are other factors, non-economic in nature. It has to be kept in mind that a large
part of the informal trade flourishes because of the traditional, historical, and ethnic links.
Another factor that could be an important determinant of informal trade flows is that the
traders with lower education may actually have lower access to the formal channel. Thus
factors influencing informal trade flows would cover not only the conventional ones arising
out of trade and domestic policy distortions but also a host of institutional and non-
economic factors.
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the analytical
framework of the study; section 3 describes the sampling frame of the study while the
profile of formal and informal traders of our sample is highlighted in section 4. Section 5
and 6 discuss the transacting environment of informal and formal trade respectively. In
Section 7,  perceptions of traders on factors influencing informal trade are analysed. In
Section 8 the discriminating characteristics of formal and informal traders are analysed
while the last section summarises the survey findings.
                                                            
6 If there is absence or shortage of warehousing facilities, informal channel will be preferred.
7  See Taneja, 1999.
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2.  Framework for Analysis
 In drawing comparisons between informal and formal trading arrangements it is useful
to draw on the notion of institutions. While there is still a lack of agreement on the precise
definition of institutions there is growing consensus on institutions as a set of collectively
defined rules, norms and constraints that govern the behaviour of individuals or groups.
These rules and constraints can be formal or informal (Nabli and Nugent 1989a ; 1989b).
In the present context formal and informal institutions that serve similar functions (i.e. they
carry out trade across national boundaries) are compared. The agents performing such
functions are the formal and informal traders. What demarcates formal traders from
informal traders? Under formal trading arrangements, the recourse to law defines contracts
between two contracting parties. This ensures that goods move across borders and
payments are guaranteed. On the other hand contracting parties in informal trade cannot
resort to the law for violation of terms of contract. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume
that individuals trading through informal channel have developed parallel institutional
mechanisms for contract enforcement and dispute settlement. It therefore becomes
imperative to focus on issues of enforcement mechanisms including aspects of risk and
information in informal trading. On the other hand it is important to understand the
institutional structure that supports formal trade where exchange is affected by factors
which are not related to the physical process of production, such as, administrative
processes, government rules and regulations, infrastructure bottlenecks etc.
The current analysis is carried out using insights from the New Institutional Economics
(NIE). The NIE differs from both neo-classical economics and from the 'old institutional
approach'. While neo-classical economics focuses on perfect markets, such theory is
devoid of institutions. The 'old institutional approach' on the other hand, recognises the
importance of institutions but does not provide a theoretical foundation (Langlois 1986). In
contrast, the New Institutional Economics questions the two crucial assumptions of neo-
classical economics namely cost-less transactions and perfect information and stresses on
the role of institutions in facilitating market exchange by reducing transactions costs,
providing a predictable framework for exchange and overcoming imperfect information
(Assaad 1993; Bardhan 1989).
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In the present context it is argued that while both institutional arrangements i.e. the
formal and informal facilitate trade in goods across countries, they are carried out at a cost
viz., transactions cost. These costs include those of organising, maintaining and enforcing
the rules of an institutional arrangement. A rational behaviour would imply that a more
efficient institution (in terms of lower costs) should be preferred over less efficient one
(Coase 1960).  It is hypothesised here that transaction costs of operating through the
informal channel are less than those under formal trading. If this is true, such trade may not
shift to legal channels and may, in fact, co-exist with formal trade.
The objective in juxtaposing formal and informal institutions in performing similar
transactions viz., engaging in cross-border international trade is threefold: first, to
understand how informal trading markets function vis-à-vis formal trading arrangements;
second, to analyse formal and informal trading arrangements particularly in the context of
the relative importance of institutional factors vis-à-vis trade and domestic policy
distortions; and third, to see whether informal trading arrangements provide better
institutional solutions than formal trading arrangements.
Given the nature of the study, it is obvious that we need to obtain primary data for
analysing the above issues. The study is based essentially on a survey approach covering
both formal and informal traders in India and Nepal. The details of the sampling frame are
given below.
3  Sample Design
India and Nepal share an extremely porous (open) border of length of more than 1800
kilometres spanning over four states in India (West Bengal, Sikkim, Bihar, and Uttar
Pradesh) and 25 districts of Nepal. Discussions with knowledgeable people revealed that
very little trade (formal or informal) takes place through the border region of Sikkim.
Consequently, samples of Indian traders were drawn from the other three states of India.
Correspondingly traders were selected in the border region in Nepal.8
                                                            
8 The centres covered in India were Naxalbari, Jogbani, Raxaul, Banbasa, Nepalganj Road, Nautanwa,
Barhni, and Calcutta. The centres covered in Nepal were Kakarbhitta, Biratnagar, Birganj, Mahendranagar,
Nepalganj, Bhairwa and Krishnanagar,
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It was, ex-ante, decided that contraband high-value goods like gold, silver, diamonds,
drugs/narcotics, arms/ammunition would be kept outside the purview of the study.  This
was done with the twin purposes of obtaining better quality of responses and at the same
time reducing the risk of canvassing the questionnaire.
 The survey encompassed an equal number of traders in formal and informal trade.
Given the time and cost consideration, 154 traders consisting of 77 traders each in formal
channel and informal channel were covered.  To give a fair representation of the country
effect, the sample of 78 Indian traders and 76 Nepalese traders was divided equally
between formal and informal traders. The number of sampling units drawn from each
centre was proportionate to the relative importance of that centre in formal and informal
trading activity.9
The sample of formal traders was randomly selected from the list of formal traders
kept with the offices of custom department of the selected centres in India and Nepal.     By
contrast, there was no sample frame for informal traders from which to choose a random
sample.10  Consequently, the list of informal traders to be interviewed in different centres
was prepared on the basis of discussions with knowledgeable persons. Such a selection
procedure may lead to a biased sample.  Thus, given the nature of the sample of informal
traders, the survey estimates may only be indicative and not firm estimates.
4 Profile of Informal and Formal Traders
The profile of informal traders in India revealed that while 31 (79%) of the
respondents exported informally, 10 (26%) were engaged in importing activity (see Table
1).  In Nepal 20 (53%) were exporters while 19 (50%) were importers. Further it can be
seen that while in India only 2 informal traders were engaged in both exports and imports,
in Nepal only one trader was engaged in both exporting and importing. Two inferences on
trading activity of informal traders can be drawn from the survey data. First, the survey
shows that informal traders in both India and Nepal are engaged in either exporting or
importing activity. Second, the evidence clearly points to a two-way informal trade
                                                            
9 The degree of importance of the various centers of informal trade is based on discussions with groups of
informed persons. See Pohit and Taneja (2000) for details.
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between India and Nepal. It needs to be pointed out that this is contrary to available
evidence, which points out to a one-way informal trade from Nepal to India11.
 The profile of formal traders in the Indo-Nepal survey shows that while in the Indian
territory 33 (85%) of them were engaged in exporting, 12 (31%) were importers. In the
Nepal territory, 21 (55%) formal traders were engaged in exports and 28 (74%) in
imports. Thus, as in informal trade, formal traders are also engaged in a two-way trade. In
fact, in formal trade a larger number of traders were involved in both exports and imports
than in informal trade (see Table 1).
Table 1 Trading Activity
Category of Trader Respondents in India Respondents in Nepal
Informal Formal Informal Formal
Exporter 31 33 20 21
Importer 10 12 19 28
Domestic market 20 27 22 23
Formal - - 1 -
Informal - 5 - 5
Total respondents 39 39 38 38
A second aspect that was probed into was the link between formal and informal
channels. None of the informal traders in India were using the formal channel while in
Nepal there was only one such trader. Five respondents each in India and Nepal in formal
trade were using the informal channel. The evidence from the survey points out that by and
large traders do not trade simultaneously through both formal and informal channels.
Information was also sought on the type of commodities traded in both informal and
formal channels. Since the trading activity of traders revealed that they are essentially
engaged in both exports and imports, respondents have been clubbed on the basis of the
direction of traded goods. Thus exporters in India and importers in Nepal are classified
under 'India to Nepal' while exporters in Nepal and importers in India are classified under
'Nepal to India'. Henceforth this terminology will be used for the rest of the survey
wherever the emphasis is on the direction of trade. Table 2 tabulates the percent of
respondents trading in at least one item from the different product categories. The survey
revealed that 50% of the respondents in the informal sector and 59% in the formal channel
                                                                                                                                                                                    
10 The list of traders included only those who were organisers of trade and not the carriers of smuggled
goods across the border.
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were engaged in trading in food products from India to Nepal. Other important
commodities traded informally from India to Nepal were textiles and consumer goods. In
the formal sector 33% of the traders were engaged in trading consumer goods/machinery
from India to Nepal. Formal traders were found to be engaged in trading of machinery
items and primary products- in both these product categories, presence of informal traders
was not significant.
With regard to goods traded from Nepal to India, the commodity markets were
generally found to be segmented in the commodity groups mentioned in Table 2. In the
informal channel 70% of the respondents were engaged in trading in electronic items while
43% traded in other consumer goods. In the formal channel, food items were the most
predominant category traded from Nepal to India followed by other consumer goods.
Table 2 Commodities Traded
Percent of Respondents
India to Nepal  Nepal to India
Informal Formal Informal Formal
Food 50 59 13 61
Primary including
intermediate goods
8 23 7 27
Textiles 28 18 40 12
Electronics 4 0 70 0
Other consumer goods 30 33 43 48
Machinery 6 33 0 3
Other 0 7 0 3
At a dis-aggregated level, food items namely, rice and pulses, consumer goods namely,
salt, and cosmetics, textiles mainly, ready-made garments and fabric were traded
informally from India to Nepal.12 In the formal channel, food items particularly, rice,
potatoes, consumer goods such as soaps, biscuits were traded by a majority of traders from
India to Nepal. On the other hand, goods traded informally from Nepal to India comprised
mainly of electronics items, and a wide range of other consumer goods.13 In the formal
channel, some of the important consumer items traded were mustard, ginger, soaps and
detergents, and herbal medicines.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
11 See Muni (1992)
12 See Pohit and Taneja (2000) for more details.
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5 Transacting Environment of Informal Traders
Given the institutional focus of the study the stance of the questionnaire was directed at
eliciting information on the transacting environment of informal traders. Information was
sought on the controllers of informal trade, sourcing of goods, entry characteristics of
informal traders, risk and information, and financing informal trade in order to analyse the
institutional mechanism that drives informal trading.
5.1 Sourcing of Goods
An aspect that needs to be examined is whether informal trade is carried out in goods
produced locally in and around the border areas. If goods traded informally are
predominantly produced locally in the border region, then one can presume that informal
trade would be a natural option for local traders. But, if informal traders in India and
Nepal deal in goods that are procured from states other than the border areas, then informal
trade is clearly much more organised.
Table 3 Sourcing of Goods
Proportion of trade Percent of Informal Traders
Goods from neighbouring states in India
India to Nepal*
Third country goods from
Nepal to India**
<20% 6 7
20% - 40% 4 3
40% - 60% 16 24
60% - 80% 14 17
80% - 100% 60 49
* Includes respondents in India
** Includes respondents in Nepal
Information was sought on the sourcing of exports from India and of exports from
Nepal. In India respondents were asked what proportion of their exported goods were
procured from neighbouring states and from other states in India. In Nepal respondents
were asked what proportion of the exported goods were procured locally in Nepal and
from third countries. The survey revealed that 60% of the respondents engaged in trading in
goods from India to Nepal procured 80% to 100% of their goods from neighbouring states
viz. Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal.  On the other hand, 49% of the respondents
                                                                                                                                                                                    
13 Other consumer items exported informally from Nepal to India are electrical goods, crystal, cosmetics,
umbrellas, shoes, bags, film roll etc while those exported from India to Nepal are cosmetics, salt,
medicines etc.
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trading in goods from Nepal to India claimed that 80% to 100% of the goods they traded in
were third country goods (see Table 3).  It needs to be pointed out that even though a large
proportion of trade from Nepal to India is carried out in third country goods, the remaining
proportion of trade is carried out in locally produced Nepalese goods.14
Thus what does get established from the survey is that while informal trade from India
to Nepal takes place in goods produced in local border areas in India, informal trade from
Nepal to India takes place essentially in third country goods. Clearly then, there is a
sourcing network for procurement of goods for export from Nepal to India that links traders
across countries. In fact, informal trade is as organised or better-organised than formal
trade for, it implies that there is a sourcing network which involves not just the two
countries trading with each other but also other countries. The survey revealed that goods
are procured from China, Japan, Thailand, Hong Kong and Singapore.    
 At this point it is crucial to mention the important features of forms of informal trade
from Nepal to India. The informal trade from Nepal to India has two significant forms.
First, imports into Nepal from third countries are carried out through the official channel.
However, since Nepal is a land-locked country, these goods can reach Nepal only after
they cross the Indo-Nepal border.15 Thus, goods arrive in India either by air or by sea and
are then containerised to be transported to Nepal. From Nepal a large proportion of these
imports are then informally exported to India. It is important to note here that goods are
actually entering Nepal through the official channel but are going back to India across the
border informally. This form of trade can be termed as cross-border informal trade,
which includes not only third country goods but also the locally produced goods in Nepal.
A second form of informal trade takes place when Nepal imports goods, but since they are
essentially for the Indian market, they are deflected into the Indian market before they enter
Nepal. In this form of informal trade, there is no physical transfer of goods from Indian
territory to Nepal. Also, such trade is carried out only through the official channel and is
often termed as trade deflection (Muni 1992).     
                                                            
14 Some of the local Nepalese items traded informally from Nepal to India are spices, poppy seeds, herbal
medicines, resins and stone chips.
15 Most goods do not reach Nepal directly by air but come to India by sea/air and are then transported to
Nepal.
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It was also found in the course of the survey that traders engaged in direct imports from
third countries were concentrated in Kathmandu. These importers either sell their goods to
informal traders in border areas in Nepal or are involved in trade deflection. Traders in
the border areas specialise in cross-border informal trading.
5.2 Controllers of Informal Trade
 Information was sought on the groups that control informal trade both from Nepal to
India and from India to Nepal. In the case of the former we have mentioned the two forms
of informal trade that are prevalent. However, since the first step towards either form of
informal trade from Nepal to India is official imports into Nepal, traders' perceptions were
sought on controllers of imports into Nepal.  Seventy-five percent of the respondents
claimed that it was the Indian traders in Nepal while 54% of the respondents said that it
was local Nepalese traders who imported third country goods into Nepal (See Table 4).
Table 4 Controllers of Imports into Nepal
Percent of Respondents*
Politicians 0
Bureaucrats 3
Indian Entrepreneurs in Nepal 75
Local Nepalese Traders 54
* Based on perceptions of informal and formal traders in Nepal and India
 Information was sought on the controllers of the two forms of informal trade namely
cross-border informal trade and trade deflection. The survey responses are shown in Table
5. In the case of cross-border informal trade the survey revealed that of the total number of
informal trade respondents in both territories, 54% of them thought that it is controlled by
Indian traders in border areas and 46% of them claimed that it was controlled by Indian
traders residing in Nepal. On the other hand, an interesting revelation as regards trade
deflection was that 39% (of the formal traders) said that trade deflection was controlled by
bureaucrats while 27% said that it was controlled by Indian traders in Nepal.16 This
however is not surprising because trade deflection can take place only if Government
officials play an active role in connivance with traders. What does get established through
                                                            
16 In the course of the survey it was found that such trade was organised by syndicates, run mostly by
Indians residing in the border states or the metropolitan cities of India. These syndicates are responsible
for   distribution of goods. The syndicates operate in close connivance with customs officials.
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the survey is that it is Indian traders in Nepal who are controlling informal trade through
official channels.
Table 5 Controllers of Cross-border Informal Trade and  Trade Deflection
 Cross-border Trade Trade Deflection
Agents Perceptions of Informal  Traders inIndia and Nepal*
Perception of Formal Traders
in India and Nepal*
Indian traders in border areas 54 18
Indian traders in cities 27 19
Indian traders in Nepal 46 27
Politicians in India or Nepal 9 11
Bureaucrats in India or Nepal 16 39
Nepalese traders 36 3
* Respondents were allowed to tick more than one option. All numbers are percent of respondents.
5.3 Entry, Information Channels and Nature of Contracts in Informal Trading
Given the nature of informal trading, how difficult is entry into informal trading? What
kind of costs do traders incur to make an entry into informal trading? Firms were asked
how they entered informal trading. The survey revealed that in both Nepal and India entry
into informal trading was by and large made through friends or relatives (see Table 6).
While in Nepal 65% of the respondents entered through friends or relatives in India 58%
of the traders entered informal trading through this channel. The evidence points to the
presence of non-anonymous transacting.   (see Table 6).
Table 6 Entry Characteristics of Informal Traders
Percent of Respondents
Entry in informal trading Friend Relative Own initiative
Nepal
India
47
48
18
10
35
42
The mechanism that supports information flows is also very important since what the
transacting parties know and do not know will determine systematically the arrangements
that will characterise exchange between them. Informal trade hinges on how traders can
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obtain information on commodities and quantities to be traded. Traders in both India and
Nepal were asked how they obtained such information. It can be seen from Table 7 that
making personal trips was the most important channel for information for Indian as well as
Nepalese traders. It has to be borne in mind that the Indo-Nepal treaty allows for free
movement of persons across borders. The fact that there is no visa requirement for cross-
border movement makes personal trips a possible and preferred information channel. The
second most important information channels are the distribution network and the authorised
channel. It is important to note that the distribution network serves the dual purpose of both
marketing and information channel. Traders also relied on the authorised channel for
information on commodities to be traded. It is important to note that the link with the formal
channel is established through procurement of goods. The fact that it is formal traders in
Nepal, who import goods from third countries to be sold to informal traders, establishes a
link between formal and informal traders. The dependence on official media, enforcement
agencies and trade fairs as channels of information flows are virtually absent for traders
engaged in informal trader in both countries.
Table 7 Sources of Information Channels
Percent of respondents
Nepal and India
Authorised channel 34
Personal trips 77
Distribution network 34
Official media 2
Enforcement agencies 2
Trade fairs 3
Note: Respondents had the option of ticking more than one option.
 Given the institutional focus of the study, the stance of the questionnaire was directed
towards eliciting information on contractual arrangements between informal trading
partners. Respondents were asked how their trade deals were finalised with the alternative
of ticking more than one option. 33% of the traders stated that making advance payments
were an important instrument for finalising trade deals. Further, 31% of the respondents
  15
claimed that prior dealing with the trading partner was an important factor in finalising
trade deals. (See Table 8). What is evident from the analysis is that personal contact
(through personal trips) with trading partners not only establishes non-anonymity between
transacting parties but also ensures knowledge about the attributes, characteristics and
features of the trading partners. The evidence that both advance payments and prior
dealings are almost equally important in finalising trade deals implies, that while advance
payments is the followed norm, prior dealings ensures that cheating, opportunism and
shirking will not pay.
 Table 8 Finalisation of Trade Deals
Modes Percent  of respondents
India and Nepal
Advance payment 33
Collateral used 9
Prior dealing 31
Third party reference 21
Goods on credit 22
Note: Respondents had the choice of ticking more than one option.
 The infrequent use of collateral in India and Nepal provides indirect evidence
supporting absence of significant information asymmetries among transacting parties,
which again stems from non-anonymity between trading partners.
5.4 Risk
An aspect crucial in informal trading is the risk associated with informal trading. The
vital aspects here are extent of risk, risk sharing arrangements and mechanisms of risk
mitigation that are prevalent among trading partners trading informally. Respondents in
both India and Nepal were asked about the extent of risk faced by traders in risk attributes
arising out of the transacting environment of informal traders. Risk for exporters could
arise due to delay in delivery of goods, default in payment, and due to seizure while that
for importers could arise due to goods not conforming to specifications, default in delivery
and delay of goods. Exporters and importers in the Indian and Nepal territory were asked
to rank their perception on the extent of risk ranging from never, rarely to frequent. The
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survey revealed that the modal range for each of the attributes of both exporters and
importers was either 'never' or 'rarely'. The responses were marked by the absence of
frequent occurrence as the modal frequency of any risk attribute (see Table 9).
Table 9 Risk Perceptions of Informal Traders
Nature of Risk Importers’ Risk* Exporters’ Risk*
Goods not conforming to specifications: 59  (never)
Incidence of default in delivery of goods 65 (never)
Incidence of delay in delivery of goods: 68 (rarely) 63 (rarely)
Default in payment 69 (never)
Incidence of goods lost due to seizure 55 (rarely)
*Percent of respondents in modal class; labels in parentheses refer to modal range in options: never,
rarely, and frequently.
Further, in the context of risk associated with seizure, respondents were asked to give
their perception on the probability of being caught by enforcement agencies. Table 10
reveals that 74% of the respondents in Nepal and 81% of the respondents in India claimed
that the probability of getting caught is less than 0.03. In fact none of the respondents said
that the probability of getting caught exceeded 0.1
Table 10 Stylised Facts of Risk for Informal Traders
Percent of Respondents
Probability of goods being
seized
<.03 0.03 - 0.05 0.05-0.1 0.1-0.2
Nepal
India
74
81
18
16
8
3
0
0
Payments to enforcement
agencies(%)
1-3 % 3-6 % 6-10% > 10 %
India
Nepal
59
65
24
25
14
10
3
0
Risk sharing in case of seizure Equally Primarily by
sender of goods
Primarily by
receiver of
goods
By the party in the
country in which
goods are seized
India
Nepal
 5
11
95
50
0
25
0
14
If risk perceived by informal traders regarding various attributes is low, then clearly
traders have developed mechanisms to mitigate risk. As mentioned earlier, non-anonymous
transacting is an important mechanism that minimises risk in informal trading.  Further,
informal traders make payments to enforcement agencies to mitigate risk.  As Table 10
shows, 59% of the traders in India and 65% in Nepal paid bribes of 1% to 3% of their
turnover to enforcement agencies.
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Another aspect that needed to be investigated was the risk sharing arrangements
between trading partners. Information was sought on the nature of risk sharing arrangements
in case of goods being seized by enforcement agencies. Table 10 shows that in both India
and Nepal risk was essentially borne by the sender of goods. Since informal trade between
India and Nepal is essentially a two-way trade, the arrangement where risk is borne by the
sender appears to be the norm.
Information was also sought on the mechanism for dispute settlement among contracting
parties. In both Nepal and India informal traders approached the informal trading groups or
a third party with mutual consent to resolve disputes. In several cases traders reported that
they depended on their ethnic ties to resolve conflicts.
5.6 Transaction Costs
Informal traders incur transaction costs in the form of payments made to enforcement
agencies as bribes, transportation costs, cost of credit and cost of currency conversion.
Table 11 shows that 72% of the informal traders in India and 61% in Nepal had to bear
transactions cost of less than 10% of their turnover.
Table 11 Transaction Costs
Percent of Informal Traders
Transaction Cost <10% 10% to 20% 20% to 30% >30%
India 72 10 3 0
Nepal 61 36 3 0
Another aspect that was probed into was whether bribes as a percent of turnover had
declined with a free trade agreement between India and Nepal. Contrary to expectation,
only 13% of the respondents in India and 2% of the respondents in Nepal said that bribes
had declined. On the other hand, 44% and 51% respondents in India and Nepal
respectively replied that bribes had increased.
Traders were further asked why payment of bribes to enforcement agencies had
increased.17 Traders offered a number of explanations. Most of the traders said that custom
officials in border areas and officials from the Border Security Force see this as an
opportunity to raise their personal incomes. Moreover, bribes had become pervasive with
links from the border officials through the bureaucracy to the politicians. Yet another
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reason cited by some traders was the frequent change of officials at the border which meant
every new official wanted to maximise his additional income for the duration of his stay in
the border area.
5.7 Financing Informal Trade
Intrinsic to the activity of informal trading is the issue of financing such activities since
cross-border trade transactions are complete only when payments are made.  Information
was sought on the transacting environment of financing informal trade. The issues here are-
what are the sources of finance for informal trading and what are the modes of financing
such trade.
The survey revealed that all the respondents in India and 97% of the traders in Nepal
raised at least some proportion of finances from their own funds. Borrowing from friends
and relatives was the second most important source of financing (see Table 12).  The role
of informal moneylenders and the use of the official or formal banking system for
borrowing funds were not considered important in both India and Nepal.
Table 12 Sources of Finance for Informal trade
Percent of Respondents
India Nepal
Friends and relatives 23 47
Informal money lenders 10 13
Banks 0 5
Own finance 100 97
Note: Respondents were given the choice of ticking more than one
option.
It can be seen from the table that a majority of the exporters and importers in both India
and Nepal financed between 80% to 100% of trade in the Indian currency. In fact it was
found in the course of the survey that the Indian currency was readily accepted in Nepal.
6 Transacting environment in Formal Trading
It has been noted earlier that the trade between India and Nepal is governed by Indo-
Nepal Treaties of Trade, of Transit, and Agreement for Co-operation to Control
Unauthorised Trade, 1996.  Under this treaty, India provides on a non-reciprocal basis
without quantitative restrictions (QRs) duty free access to the Indian market for all but a
                                                                                                                                                                                    
17 This was an open-ended question to elicit informal traders' perceptions.
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few Nepalese manufactured products. Such imports from Nepal are facilitated through a
procedure of Certificate of Origin issued by Federation of Nepalese Chambers of
Commerce and industry and other affiliated Chambers of commerce to which this power
has been delegated by His Majesty's Government of Nepal (HMGN).  However, Nepalese
import continues to be subjected to Indian countervailing duty.  Furthermore, there is
provision in the treaty for goods which do not fulfil the conditions required by the
Certificate of Origin, to obtain preferential treatment in India provided they are
manufactured in the small scale units in Nepal. The GOI extends parity in the levy of
Additional Duty on such Nepalese products equal to the treatment provided in the levy of
effective Excise Duty on similar Indian products under the Indian Customs and Central
Excise Tariff.  On its part, Nepal exempts, wholly or partially, imports from India from
customs duty and QRs to the maximum extent compatible with their development needs and
protection of their industries.  Also, both the countries, on a reciprocal basis, would
exempt the import of such primary products from basic custom duty as well as from QRs,
as may be agreed upon, from each other. Bilateral trade between the two countries would
normally be conducted in Indian Rupees, though provision exists for importing few
commodities from India against payment in convertible currency.  Moreover, the treaty
states that payment for transactions between the two countries would continue to be made
in accordance with their respective foreign exchange laws, rules, and regulations.
While the treaty provides incentive for Indo-Nepal bilateral trade, it does not imply that
the exporters/importers would be waived from import/export documentation procedures.
For an Indian trader, exporting through official channel consists of several steps starting
with obtaining import-export licenses, imports for exports etc, quality control certification,
and ending with receiving export remittances through banks. Importing legally is by no
means simple for an Indian trader as it also involves several steps such as obtaining import
licenses, letter of credit authorisation form, availability of finance, freight and insurance
certificates, clearance from custom, etc. While these procedures are present in some form
in the trade regulations of Nepal, Nepalese traders benefit to some extent due to the
simplicity of rules in Nepal. For instance, all imports may be brought in Nepal without a
licence barring a few banned or restricted items such as (a) products injurious to health;
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(b) arms and ammunition etc (c) communication equipment etc, (d) valuable metal and
jewellery, and (e) beef and beef products.
In general, documentation requirements are extensive for Indian traders and delays are
frequent.  They exist for the Nepalese traders as well though on a lower scale. All these
procedural complexities along with institutional bottleneck and lack of information
transparency give rise to rent-seeking activities by the officials at various stages of trading.
These cost traders time, money and cash, including additional detention and demurrage
charges, making it more expensive to trade. Following Coase (1960) terminology, we have
called these as transaction costs, which exporters or importers incur in terms of time
constraint and/or in the form of money resources they spend in the process. How high is the
transaction cost in India relative to that of Nepal? Below, we have made an attempt using
our survey information to quantify the transaction cost of formal trading activities in Nepal
and India.
The export-import policy documents of India and Nepal are scanned to understand the
nature and magnitude of procedural complexities at different stages of export/import
transactions.  Since trade regulations are not same in both the countries, we have decided
to compare the sources of transaction cost at the following steps that are common to most
trade transaction:18  (1) problem in obtaining different licenses, (2) problem associated
with custom authorities,19 (3) problems relating to banks, (4) problems associated with
transportation of goods.
Table 13 shows our survey findings on the incidence of transaction cost (measured in
terms of percentage of traders indicating positive cost) in India and Nepal arising from the
above four sources. As columns (2) and (3) of this table shows, Nepalese traders faced
fewer problems due to licensing-- 49% of Nepalese traders indicated that they had faced
positive transaction cost against 55% of Indian traders.20 Note that traders in both countries
indicated that incidence of transaction cost due to custom problem are few. This is
expected since trade between them is in all reality free of tariff and quantitative restriction.
                                                            
18 Another source of transaction cost could be obtaining various duty refunds.  However, most of the
traders in our survey answered that question as not applicable. So, we have not analysed this source of
transaction cost.
19 For exporters from Nepal, this includes problems faced in obtaining rules of origin certification.
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With regard to problem relating to banks and transportation, our survey revealed that
occurrence of problem (thereby positive transaction cost) is marginally more in the
Nepalese territory.
Table 13 Profile of transaction cost
% of traders indicating
positive cost in
% of Indian traders reporting
additional time required (in days)
% of Nepalese traders reporting
additional time required (in days)
Stages of
transaction
s India Nepal 1-10 11-19 >  20 1-10 11-19 > 20
Licenses 55 49 25 35 50 30 9 61
Custom 14 18 100 100
Banks 30 36 100 93 7
Transport. 46 48 100 92 8
Table 13 also depicts the break-up of the additional time taken at different steps of
transaction. The additional time taken is estimated in our case as the difference between the
actual time taken and the average of trader’s perception about the time that should be
required at these stages.  The table reveals that licensing typically takes more than 20 extra
days for 50 percent of Indian traders requiring additional time.  Moreover, 35% of the
remaining Indian traders have to spend 11 to 19 additional days to sort the licensing
problem.  It takes less than 10 additional days only for 25 % of Indian traders. By contrast,
Nepalese traders indicated that licensing required more than 20 days for 61% of traders,
11-19 days for 9% of traders and less than 10 days for 30% of traders.  Table  14 also
shows that Nepalese traders in comparison to Indian traders faced higher transaction cost
(in terms of additional time required) from their respective authorities due to banking and
transportation problem.
Finally, what is the magnitude of combined transaction cost as share of their turnover?
The relevant data are tabulated in Table 14.  As this table shows, the transaction cost as
percent of turnover is lower in Nepal than in India. Note that 36% of the respondents in
India have indicated that transaction cost could be more than 30% where as only 16% of
the respondents in Nepal have reported it to be more than 30%. It should be mentioned that
the bribe component of transaction cost as percent of turnover in both countries usually lie
                                                                                                                                                                                    
20 Whenever a trader indicates that he has faced problem at licensing stage, we consider it to be a
incidence of positive transaction cost.
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between 1% to 5%. Further, our survey of traders engaged in Indo-Nepal trade indicates
that payments to officials as bribes for export/import activities never exceed 10%.
Table  14  Magnitude of Transaction Cost in Indo-Nepal Trade
Percent of respondents inTransaction cost as percent  of
their turnover in the range of India Nepal
Less than 10% 33 18
10%  to 20% 13 42
20% to 30% 18 24
More than 30% 36 16
Note: Transaction cost here includes total payment as bribes to officials at
various stages plus transportation cost plus cost of credit.
As in the case of Indo-Nepal survey, respondents were asked whether bribes as a
percentage of their turnover have declined over time due to greater transparency as a result
of liberalisation. Only 6 % of formal traders in Nepal and 12% in India have indicated that
bribes have declined. By contrast, 42% in Nepal and 38% in India have claimed that
bribes have increased.21
An interesting feature that emerged was that formal traders preferred not to take
recourse to law when faced by any kind of risk even though by definition formal traders
can approach the courts in such a situation. Given the weak judiciary, formal traders
preferred to settle the dispute mutually or approached traders/business associations for
settlement of dispute.  We find that a number of respondents in India/Nepal made use of
their ethnic ties to solve disputes.  This implies how formal traders are actually using
mechanisms of informal trading to circumvent institutional barriers to trade.
7 Why Informal Trade takes Place
  The traditional argument is that informal trade takes place due to trade and domestic
policy distortions. As and when such distortions are corrected informal trade would shift
to the formal channel. As mentioned earlier, the present study focuses on several other
factors that could arise from the transacting environment of formal and informal traders.
Factors influencing informal trade can be classified under three broad categories- (i) those
that are related to the policy environment (ii) institutional factors and (iii) non-economic
                                                            
21 52% and 50% of respondents in Nepal and India respectively have indicated status quo.
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factors. Both informal and formal traders were asked to tick the factors they considered
important in influencing informal trade. Traders in both countries were classified on the
basis of the direction of movement of goods. Table 15 shows that for traders involved in
sending goods from Nepal to India, goods imported from third countries was the most
important factor. This factor is clearly related to the difference in tariffs with the rest of the
world prevailing between Nepal and India. In the context of SAFTA, this implies that third
country goods do not meet the requirement of rules of origin principles and are therefore
traded informally from Nepal to India. What can be inferred is that tariffs play a crucial
role in determining the informal trade flows from Nepal to India.22 Other important factors
were all related to institutional factors. No paperwork, lower bribes and quick realisation
of payments in the informal channel were cited as the most important factors influencing
informal trade from Nepal to India (see Table 15).
Table 15 Reasons for Informal trade (Percent of Respondents)
Nepal to India India to Nepal
Low transportation costs 43 55
Lower time to reach destination 20 28
Imported from third country 70 0
No paperwork 62 78
No procedural delays 42 66
Lower bribes 60 48
Quick realization of payments 44 70
Presence of haats/bazaars 13 36
Absence/shortage of storage/warehousing facilities 8 17
Ethnic ties across the border 15 31
Absence of trading routes 1 8
Leakage of administered price goods 1 3
Presence of high duty in official channel 34 27
Quantitative Restrictions 10 17
Easier to meet demand from across the border rather than the
domestic market
25 23
Nexus between BSF personnel and the traders 27 35
Nexus between traders and politicians 4 4
On the other hand institutional factors are the most important factors influencing informal
trade flows from India to Nepal. The important ones are- no paperwork, quick realisation
of payments and no procedural delays. All these factors give rise to transaction costs in the
                                                            
22 The difference between Nepal and India’s tariff rates on goods traded informally from Nepal to India
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formal channel. A spearman’s rank correlation of the ranking of the factors influencing
trade flows from Nepal to India and from India to Nepal was only 0.58. The factor, which
could be causing such a low correlation, is the importance of third country goods in
informal trade flows from Nepal to India. On eliminating this factor, the rank correlation
increases to 0.89. The difference in the rank correlation can thus be ascribed to the relative
importance of third country goods in informal trade flows from Nepal to India.
8  Discriminating Characteristics of Formal and Informal Traders
In the earlier sections, we have analysed empirically characteristics of formal and
informal traders engaged in Indo-Nepal trade as well as important aspects of modality and
behaviour of such trade. While the analysis has suggested differences between formal and
informal traders/trade in many respects, these need to be evaluated by some statistical
criteria to draw conclusive evidence on differences between the two types of traders/trade.
The significance of the differences between the two types of traders/trade is first evaluated
in terms of a univariate statistical criterion. The parameters identified by the univariate test
as important in differentiating the two groups are then simultaneously included in a
multivariate test to control for possible mutual interaction.
8.1  Univariate Analysis of Differences
The univariate test applied here is non-parametric. The advantage of using a non-
parametric test is that it does not assume any specific distribution of the population under
analysis.  The test is appropriate since we have very little knowledge of the population
(i.e. informal traders).  The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is applied here since it is one of the
most powerful ones among the non-parametric tests.
The results of the univariate statistical tests in terms of twenty parameters governing
different aspects of trader/trade are depicted in Table 16.  As this table indicates, the tests
have been carried out separately for the characteristics of Indian traders and Nepalese
traders.  The database  comprises of thirty-nine pairs of traders for India and thirty-eight
pairs of observations  for Nepal.   A one-tailed test has been conducted (at a 10% level of
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ranged between 5% and 30%.
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significance) since we have prior hypotheses regarding the direction of the difference in
many cases.
 The earlier sections have emphasised the role of transaction cost in informal and
formal trading arrangements. One of the key hypotheses in the paper is to test whether
informal trade flourishes because of lower transaction cost in informal trading than in
formal trading. In this context the survey instrument was used to examine the transacting
environment of both informal and formal traders and also to arrive at the transactions costs
that traders incur.23 The sign-rank test suggests that transaction cost in formal in India as
well as in Nepal is significantly higher than the informal counterpart.
Does a lower level of education amongst  informal traders act as deterrent to the use of
the formal channel? The result of the test indeed proves our a priori prediction that
informal traders have a lower level of education than formal traders.
A related hypothesis was to test whether informal traders had a lower awareness of
SAFTA than formal traders . The direction of differences suggests that that awareness of
SAFTA is less among the informal traders than their formal counterparts.
  It has also been argued in Taneja (1999) that ethnic ties/family linkages play a
dominant role in aiding/abetting informal trade. The test  indicates that  informal traders
show significantly more ethnic linkages than the formal ones in both India and Nepal.
The next five parameters are constructed to test whether informal traders have
developed better or more efficient mechanisms for information. It is possible that because
of the poor transport networks and storage facilities, informal trader plays an important
role in narrowing down the short-term demand/supply gap in the border regions. If that is
so, the informal trader relative to formal counterpart should not carry out transaction in the
same commodity over time. Moreover, the same should indulge in trading more
commodities depending on the demand/supply condition. The results of the test indicate
that on both counts, significant differences in attributes are observed for Indian as well as
Nepalese traders.
                                                            
23Transaction costs for informal traders includes payments made to enforcement agencies, transportation
costs, cost of credit and cost of currency exchange. For formal traders transaction costs include bribes
paid at various stages to officials, transportation costs including insurance and cost of credit.
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How well the information channel for informal trading arrangement is developed is
judged by the following two attributes: (a) time taken for first trade deal and (b) time
taken for subsequent trade deal.  The result shows that informal trading arrangement in
India as well as Nepal takes less time for subsequent trade deals than the formal
counterpart.   However the null hypothesis is accepted in both the territories for the other
attribute, namely, time taken for first trade deal.
If the informal traders function because of short-term demand/supply gap, and they shift
their commodities from time to time, their margin should exhibit higher fluctuation than the
formal one depending on the demand/supply situation.  On the contrary, the test for the
Nepalese traders shows that the fluctuation of margin is more for the formal trader.
However, the test fails to identify any differences for the Indian traders.
The next attribute relates to the combined risk (viz., goods not conforming to
specification and incidence of default/delay in delivery)  that a traders face in carrying out
their transaction. Since informal trade is not legal, do the informal traders face higher risk?
The statistical tests fail to identify any significant differences in risk between the two of
trade in either country.
 The next two parameters  look at the financing part of formal and informal traders.
Being quasi-legal in nature, informal traders do not have access to finance from legal
financial institution under this head.  How do they meet their financing need?  Do they use
their own finance for carrying out business?  Inference from the test is that for the Indian
traders, own finance plays a larger role in informal trade than the formal counterpart.
However, the picture on the Nepalese territory is just the opposite: own finance is more in
the case of formal traders than the informal one.
If a trader needs to borrow, the formal one has access to legal banking sector while the
informal trader has access only to the informal banking sector.24 The latter market usually
carries a higher interest rate.  What do our survey findings indicate on this count? The
analysis indicates that Indian informal traders pay higher interest rate than the formal one
whereas the test fails to bring out any significant differences in the interest rate between the
two types of traders in Nepal.
                                                            
24 Of course, an informal trader may borrow from banking sector for a different  purpose and uses the
loan for informal trading. This is feasible, for instance, if he also trades in domestic market.
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 How different are the sourcing patterns of formal and informal traders? It has been
argued in the earlier section that third country import is an important component of India’s
informal import from Nepal. Statistically speaking, one can hypothesise that third country
import into India  is more in the informal channel than in the formal channel. Our evidence
from the test shows that this phenomenon is more in the case of informal trade.
Transporting goods from eastern part of Nepal to western part is costly as the roads run
through hilly region. In this situation, it is reasonable to bring goods, formally or informally
through neighbouring region in India. If official trading routes are inadequate in the area,
traders in both the countries will meet their demand from neighbouring region. Is this
pattern more in the case of informal trade? Our test fails to identify any significant
differences in the attributes local area trade between the two types of traders in India or
Nepal.
Table  16 Results of Wilcoxon's Signed-ranked test
Nepalese Territory*      Indian Territory*Sl. No.                      Parameter
Z statistics Inference Z statistics Inference
1 Transaction Cost (TC) 4.575 Fo>If 4.488 Fo>If
2 Education level (Edu) 2.417 Fo>If 1.333 Fo>If
3 Awareness of SAFTA (SAFTA) 2.50 Fo>If 2.485 Fo>If
4 Ethnic ties (Ethnic) -1.706 Fo<If -2.810 Fo<If
5 Number of commodities traded (Com #) 2.821 Fo>If 3.233 Fo>If
6 Trading in same commodities (Same) 2.029 Fo>If 1.947 Fo>If
7 Time taken for first trade deal (TimFr) 1.138 Accept null 1.244 Accept null
8 Time taken for subsequent trade deals (TimSq) 2.936 Fo>If 2.819 Fo>If
9 Margin fluctuation (MarFl) 3.704 Fo>If -1.213 Accept null
10 Risk -1.211 Accept null -1.112 Accept null
11 Own finance (OwnFin) 1.76 Fo>If -2.768 Fo<If
12 Interest rate (Int) -0.915 Accept null -2.485 Fo<If
13  Third country import (Nepm) -4.412 Fo<If -2.823 Fo<If
14 Local area trade (Local)) 1.117 Accept null .534 Accept null
15 Turnover 5.421 Fo>If 4.307 Fo>If
16 Rate of entry/exit (Ent/Ex) 0.830 Accept null 0.16 Accept null
17 Trading Period (TrdPrd) 2.820 Fo>If 0.314 Accept null
18 Presence in domestic market (PreDom) 1.295 Fo>If -2.485 Fo<If
19 Profit 1.603 Fo>If -2.632 Fo<If
20 Border price differential (BorPr) 2.751 Fo>If -0.231 Accept null
* Fo pertains to formal while If pertains to informal. Tests have been carried out at 10% level of significance
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Is the informal trading characterised by higher rate of entry and exit than the formal
counterpart?  In other words, is the formal trader typically in business over a longer period
than the formal one?  The statistical test on rate of entry and exit fails to identify any
differences in the traders in either country. However, the test for the attribute, trading
period, suggests that formal traders in Nepal are typically in business over a longer period
than the formal one.
 Do informal traders have a larger presence in the domestic market than formal traders?
The test suggests that while in Nepal formal traders have larger presence in domestic
market in the Indian territory informal traders exhibit a larger presence in the domestic
market.
Maximisation of profits is the objective function at individual level in any trading
activities.  Naturally, one ponders whether there is significant difference between the profit
margins in the two channels. The test on differences in profit margin of Nepalese traders
between the two channels is rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis of lower profit
margin in the informal traders.  However for Indian traders, we find that profit margin is
more for the informal traders.
Expectedly, the border price differential is the driving force for sustaining
informal/formal trade activities.  In this connection, one may question whether traders
prefer one channel to another depending on the border price differential.  Our result
partially supports the hypothesis in the sense that higher border price differential prevails
for trading through formal channel in the Nepalese traders.
8.2 Multivariate Analysis
The factors identified by the univariate tests as important in differentiating the two
groups are then simultaneously included in a multivariate test to control for possible mutual
interaction. Our preferred choice of multivariate technique is step-wise discriminant
analysis.25 The discriminant analysis involves the fitting of linear discriminant score
function on the basis of observed data on a number of discriminating variables of
                                                            
25 It has been shown that discriminant analysis is a rather robust technique and can tolerate deviation from
its basic assumptions, viz. (1) discriminating variables are independent; (2) the population co-variance
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individuals whose group membership is known. These functions (sometimes known as
classification functions) can classify further cases into the groups on the basis of values of
discriminating variables. In our case, discriminant analysis can be used to examine whether
informal traders differ from formal, and if so, in terms of which characteristics.
The discriminant score functions estimated are of the form:
Yi  =   bio +  bi1 Xi1 + …   +  bin Xin    (1)
Where Yi  is the discriminant score for i =  formal trade or informal trader; Xij is the jth
discriminating variable (for j = 1 to n); and   bij is a coefficient.
An individual observation is classified into the groups for which the discriminant
score on the basis of its observed values is higher.  The goodness of fit is judged in terms
of significance of mean difference between groups, which can be expressed as F-ratio, and
the ability of the fitted discriminant functions in correctly classifying the individual cases.
 The practical consideration however demands that too many variables may not
prove to be good discriminators.  Therefore, a step-wise procedure to select the significant
discriminators was adopted.  The procedure begins by selecting the individual variable
that provides the greatest univariate discrimination (in terms of groups mean difference or
partial F-ratio or F to enter).  It then pairs the first variable with each of the remaining
variables to locate the combination, which produces the greatest discrimination.  The
variable, which contributes to the best pair, is selected.  In the third step, the procedure
goes on to combine the first two with each of the remaining variables to form triplets.  The
best triplet determines the third variable to be entered, and so on.
Below, the multivariate analysis is carried out on Nepalese traders followed by on
Indian traders.
Discriminant Analysis of Nepalese traders
The univariate analysis of statistical significance of differences of Nepalese traders
has identified 15 attributes.  Since discriminant analysis demands that none of
discriminating variables should have high correlation with other variables, one needs to
drop several of the variables.  Taking the criteria of cut-off point of correlation between
two variables as ±0.4,  the following  five variables were dropped: number of
                                                                                                                                                                                    
matrices are similar for each group; (3) each group is drawn from populations having multivariate normal
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commodities traded (Comm #), time taken for subsequent trade deals (TimeSq), trading in
same commodities (Same), share of own finance (OwnFin) and fluctuation of margin
(MarFl) to begin our discriminant analysis.26
Table 17 provides the summary of the step-wise procedure and variables selected with
their relative contribution to the discrimination in terms of their partial F-ratio (F to enter
or remove). Note that our classification rule performs reasonably well. The procedure
selects only 4 of the 10 variables to be significant discriminants, namely turnover,
education, third country import, and transaction costs. The remaining ones are not
significant in the multivariate context as they do not add to the discriminating information
contributed by the significant variables.  Note that except for the parameter third country
import, none are direct policy related parameters.
Table 17 Discriminant Analysis of Nepalese Traders*
Steps  Discriminating variable entered F to enter/ remove Degrees of
Freedom
 No. of  variables
included
1. Turnover 44.570 F(1,74) 1
2. Edu 17.503 F(1,73) 2
3. Nepm 10.337 F(1,72) 3
4. TC 7.076 F(1,71) 4
Percentage of Formal trader correctly specified 89
Percentage of Informal trader correctly specified 95
* The tests are done at 5% level of significance.
Discriminant Analysis of Indian traders
The univariate analysis of characteristics of Indian traders has identified 13 factors.
However, we drop the following five parameters--own finance (OwnFin), interest rate
(Int), time taken for subsequent trade deal (TimSq), trading in same commodities (Same),
number of commodities (Comm #) -- to ensure that all the discriminating variable satisfy
the cut-off point of correlation (±0.4). The logic behind dropping these variables is as
follows. The variables OwnFin and Int are found to be correlated with each other and
                                                                                                                                                                                    
distribution (see Klecka, 1980,  Jackson, 1983).
26TimeSq is correlated with TC since the latter takes into account time element of the cost. So, TimSq is
omitted. The variable MarFL is found to be correlated with variables such as BorPr, PreDom and hence is
dropped. The variables Same and Comm# are found to be correlated with each other and MarFl, BorPr,
PreDom and so we have decided to exclude them. OwnFin is found to be correlated with Turnover and TC.
Since the other two are cause type variables, we have omitted OwnFin. See Table 17 for explanation on the
notations of the variables.
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Turnover. Since Turnover is the cause type variables, we have decided to include it and
exclude the other two variables. The parameters Same, Comm# are dropped since they are
mutually correlated variables and are correlated with BorPr, and PreDom. The variables
TC and TimSq are correlated with each other since by its nature the variable TC takes into
account time element of the cost.
Table 18 shows the step-wise procedure and variables selected in the discriminant
analysis.  Out of the eight potential variables, the procedure select only the following three
attributes-- transaction cost, ethnic linkage, and education level.
Table 18 Discriminant Analysis of Indian traders*
Steps  Discriminating variable entered F to enter/ remove Degrees of
Freedom
 No. of  variables
included
1. TC 12.040 F(1,76) 1
2. Ethnic 8.563 F(1,75) 2
3. Edu 6.983 F(1,74) 3
Percentage of Formal trader correctly specified 74
Percentage of Informal trader correctly specified 84
* The tests are done at 5% level of significance
In summary, our analysis suggests that trade related distortion is not the main cause for
the continuation of informal trade. In fact, our analysis has picked up only one parameter
namely, third country import, related directly to trade policy. By contrast, transaction cost,
and education level, which are not directly related to policy distortion, are found to be
important attributes irrespective of the country of origin of the traders.
9  Summary of Findings
  This study makes an attempt to provide an in-depth analysis of India's informal trade
with Nepal. Using insights from the New Institutional Economics, informal and formal
institutions engaged in cross-border trade are contrasted to examine whether informal
trading arrangements provide better institutional solutions. The study is based on an
extensive primary survey conducted in India and Nepal. It needs to be emphasised that
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since the sample frame for informal traders was drawn from an unknown population  the
survey estimates may only be indicative and not firm estimates. In sum, one could make
several tentative conclusions.
At a general level, the survey data points to the evidence of a  two-way informal trade.
The survey data was also used to understand the sourcing network for procurement of
goods for informal trade. The survey reveals that goods traded from India to Nepal are
procured by and large from the neighbouring  Indian states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and
West Bengal bordering Nepal.  On the other hand, goods traded informally from Nepal to
India are by and large goods originating in third countries, the most important ones being
China, Japan, Thailand, Hong Kong and Singapore.
The survey provides evidence on various aspects of the transacting environment of
informal traders. The survey reveals that in the absence of formal contracts between
trading partners, the informal trading arrangements had developed efficient institutional
mechanisms that ensured trade across national boundaries. Evidence from the survey
supports the view that informal trading arrangements between India and Nepal are
characterised by non-anonymous transacting environment. Such contractual arrangements
not only facilitate entry of firms into informal trade, but also serve as important channels of
information flows on quantities and commodities to be traded. The distribution network
and authorised channel are the other important channels for information flows.
Given the institutional focus of the study the stance of the study was directed towards
getting information on aspects of risk in informal trading. The survey revealed that the
extent of risk for both exporters and importers was very low. Further the probability of
goods getting caught by enforcement agencies is very low. Clearly informal traders face
very little risk in operating through the informal channel. The survey points to the evidence
that informal traders have developed mechanisms to mitigate risk.
Our analysis of transacting environment of formal trade in India/Nepal indicates that
the inefficiencies of the trade regimes give rise to rent seeking activities of concerned
authorities. This is true even though Indo-Nepal trade takes place under the bilateral Indo-
Nepal free trade agreement.  An interesting feature that emerged was that formal traders
preferred to use mechanisms of informal trading to settle disputes.
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The hypothesis posed in the study was that traders would opt for the informal channel if
transaction costs of operating through informal channel are lower than the formal channel.
The survey reveals that the transaction costs in the informal channel are significantly lower
than the formal channel in both the countries. This aspect was further highlighted when
informal traders were asked about why they opted for the informal channel.  The survey
revealed that factors like quick realisation of payments, no paper work, and no procedural
delays were instrumental in driving the traders towards informal channel. The other
reasons for the preference of informal channel could be the lower size of informal trading
firms, lower level of education, and lack of awareness of trade rules among the informal
traders.  However, a large proportion of informal trade flows from Nepal to India is in
goods imported from third countries, influenced by import tariff (with the rest of the world)
differential between India and Nepal. In fact, this factor was identified as the most
important factor influencing informal trade flows from Nepal to India.
The common attributes of formal and informal traders engaged in Indo-Nepal are
analysed in a comprehensive manner by step-wise discriminant function to control for
possible mutual interaction. It is used to identify the characteristics that in combination
differentiate formal traders from informal traders.  The analysis identifies for the Nepalese
traders the following four discriminating characteristics: size of the firm, education level
of traders, transaction cost of trading and third country imports. By contrast, transaction
cost of trading, ethnic linkage of traders and their education levels are the differentiating
characteristics of the Indian formal traders from their informal counterpart.
It is reasonable to surmise that even with a rapid pace of liberalisation set by the free
trade agreement informal trade continues to thrive. However since trade from Nepal to
India takes place largely in third country goods, with lowering and equalisation of tariff
walls, such trade is likely to diminish but may not disappear, since the transaction cost of
operating through the informal channel is lower than the formal channel. Informal trade
from Nepal to India in goods other than third country goods is likely to continue since such
trade is taking place due to lower transaction costs in the informal channel. On the other
hand informal trade from India to Nepal is taking place in locally produced goods. Clearly
then such trade will continue to take place through informal channels. An important policy
implication from the study is that unless the transacting environment of formal traders
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improves, informal trade will continue to coexist with formal trade, even if free trade is
established between India and Nepal.
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